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Abstract 
This essay pursues a critical examination of Fukuyama’s appropriation of the 
Kantian/Hegelian/Marxian philosophies of history, particularly the notion of the end of history, 
and the idea of the last man. Fukuyama uses the concepts to explain what he claims to be the 
triumph of liberal democracy over socialism and many other ideologies. In Fukuyama, the notion 
of the last man has at its centre the triumph of liberal democracy – personified in the United 
States of America – over other socio-economic-political ideologies. This triumphant advent and 
settlement of liberal democracy has impact on weaker nations of Africa and other parts of the 
world. The paper advances an argument that the advent and triumph of Western liberal 
democracy, its universalization and declaration as the final form of government has perilous 
implications to African human sociocultural development. Its purposive end cannot mean the end 
of human capability to come up with a new forms of governing framework: since not all nations 
wholly embrace the ideology as the logical conclusion for social, economic, and political 
development. Fukuyama did not think within the possibilities of the aftermaths of such a 
conceptualization of history that it has a tendency of overlooking his position as a source of 
enhancing the disenfranchisement of the weaker states of the world, in particular, those in Africa. 
Africa is left out of the movement of human history towards the ‘superhuman’ by intention. The 
main ideals of Fukuyama’s notion of the end of history, namely, freedom, recognition and 
consciousness have proved not to be meant for the African people unless they assimilate into the 
Western cultural preconditions. The paper will use descriptive/analytic method.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
  In his book, The End of History and the Last Man, Fukuyama appropriates Hegel, as 
interpreted by Kojève’s philosophy of history, especially the ideas of the ‘end of history’ and 
‘struggle for recognition’. His central claim is that the triumph of liberal democracy marks the 
end of history and the realization of mutual recognition. But this triumph of liberal democracy 
leads to a number of questions with regards to African dream of mutual recognition by the USA 
and its allies in Europe and Oceania and permanent members in the United Nations. Hence the 
following questions: What is the position of Africa in the ideals of the notion of the end of history 
when the last man remains standing and rules the world regarding freedom and self-
consciousness? What is the position of Africa in the realization of mutual recognition, since it has 
always been and seemingly continues to be on the receiving end in history?   
The paper advances a two-pronged argument: First prong is that the idea of the end of 
history dates back to the early days of Judeo-Christian theology. It was graphically presented in 
eschatological terms as the realization of the kingdom of God through the coming of a messianic 
era – that era is characterized with a universal and homogenous theocratic government. 
Furthermore, the idea became secularized during and after the European enlightenment and was 
expressed in idealistic and socio-politico-economic terms that encouraged the emergence of 
various conflicting ideologies. The intention of each of these ideologies was to create some hope 
for a life of economic prosperity and happiness. This hope could be interpreted as the end of the 
'now' and the realization of the intended purpose of human existence and nature in a ‘future 
epoch.’  
The second prong of the argument pursued in this paper is that history does not end with 
the fall of communism as claimed by Fukuyama; rather it marks the decline of one era and the 
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rise of another historical era. It is within this prong that this author contends that the claimed end 
of history and the triumph of the last man saw the disenfranchisement of Africa as a continent 
and the whole world of the developing nations. Hence, the reaction that saw the rise of Russia 
and China, coups and religion based ideologies of conquest that influenced the Arab spring.  
The paper sets out to critically describe, analyze, and discuss Fukuyama's notion of the 
end of history and some philosophical works on the theories of history that lay the foundation for 
his thesis about the end of history. Fukuyama’s portrayal of history is described in terms of the 
triumphant arrival of liberal democracy over other ideologies. In examining Fukuyama, attention 
will be paid to Kant’s teleological view of human history and its ultimate end in a universal 
history. It is Kant’s concept of universal history that Fukuyama appropriates in his theory of 
history. As for Hegel’s philosophy, attention will be paid to the ideas of struggle for recognition, 
freedom, and absolute knowing. I shall look closely at Hegel’s dialectical method that pervades 
the ideas of recognition and freedom as envisaged in the context of the notion of the end of 
history. In this case, Alexander Kojève’s book, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel (1969), will 
be of importance in Fukuyama’s understanding of Hegel. Karl Marx's conception of history also 
helps in the interpretation of Hegel; especially his theory of history – historical materialism.   
Furthermore, the essay uses the descriptive/analytic method, especially the aspect of 
interpretivism, to shed light on understanding Fukuyama’s appropriation of teleological theories 
of history in reinterpreting 20th and 21st centuries development of events for Africa as a 
continent. As part of the study, it is important to look at the two concepts, “the end of history” 
and “the last man” – beginning with the “the last man.”  
Although it is clear that Fukuyama used Friedrich Nietzsche’s concept of the last man 
from the latter’s book, Thus Spoke Zarathustra – in which the former explicitly appropriated the 
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concept “the last man”, it is not clear whether Fukuyama implicitly used Mary Wollstonecraft 
Shelley”s title and concept “the Last Man.” In 1826, Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley had already 
used the term “the last man” in her sci-fi novel The Last Man. The apocalyptic book portrays a 
catastrophic future in which the last men survives the ravaging plague and famine. It is also in 
that future that technology, religion, and hope are wiped away. It is the last part of the description 
of the notion that makes this author to argue that Fukuyama also appropriated Shelly’s view of 
the notion about the last man. This is because in later writings Fukuyama concedes that there is 
no end of history but,“ which means that there can be no end of history without an end of modern 
natural science and technology. In Thus Spoke Zarathustra Nietzsche (2010, 17) introduces the 
concept of “the last man” [der latzte Mensch], he writes thus:   
Behold. I show you the last man. "What is love? What is creation? What is longing? What 
is a star?" – so asks the last man and blinks. The earth has then become small, and on it 
there hops the last man who makes everything small. His race is as ineradicable as the 
flea; the last man lives longest.” We have invented happiness", say the last men, and they 
blink. The last man emerges as an antithesis to the Ubermensch (Overman). In this 
dialectic commotion the last man, through a revolution ushers in a new beginning (of 
cause referring to the future). In both usage of the concept, the future features in as a 
common denominator of development where the last man survives the breakdown of 
order. 
 
  Concerning the concept, “end of history”, it must not be confused with the concept end of 
the world that is most prevalent in Judeo-Christian and Islamic teleological and religious 
thinking. Fukuyama (1992, xi) describes the concept “end of history” as, “A political and 
philosophical concept that supposes that a particular political, economic, or social system may 
develop that would constitute the end-point of humanity's sociocultural evolution and the final 
form of human government”. The final human government to be established comes in with a 
messianic power to usher a new world order. Furthermore, Fukuyama (1992, xi) says,    
What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of 
a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is the 
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end of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western 
liberal democracy as the final form of human government. 
  
It is this part of Fukuyama’s argument that raised eyebrows concerning the fate of weaker 
nations, such as those in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. This is because Fukuyama’s 
universalization of the notion of the end of history can always be criticized as hegemonic and of 
destructive intent.  
2. THE IDEA OF A UNIVERSAL HISTORY AND ITS GOAL IN FUKUYAMA’S MAIN 
PHILOSOPHICAL ANTECEDENTS  
Kantian, Hegelian, and Marxist philosophies of history influenced and continue to 
influence Western thinking. Kant's philosophy of history developed within the context of 
eighteenth century teleological thinking – referring to constant progress. Teleological thinking 
dates back at least as far as the philosophies of Plato (the Idea of the Good), Aristotle (all things 
aim at fulfilling some good), and Judeo-Christian theological thought (the idea of eternal 
freedom and happiness in the life to come). This conception of history in universal terms takes 
frequency in the philosophies of Kant, Hegel, and Marx. Fukuyama appropriates the Kantian and 
Hegelian theory of universal history in his notion of the end of history and the last man.   
 2.1 Kant's Teleological theory of a Universal Human History  
  Kant’s universalization of human history excludes the African, Asian, South American 
parts of humankind. Kant only sees the end of human history in teleological terms that has a 
European centre. The process of universalization in the Kantian and post-Kantian era meant the 
spread of European cultural, economic, and political interests that would create a homogenous 
world in all dimensions of human life. Fukuyama’s universalization of human history is seen in 
the triumph of liberal democracy as ushering an end to human history with the Western world, 
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especially the United States of America, as the last man standing to usher a world order in the 
form of a universal homogenous state – based on a universal homogenous ideology.  
Teleological thinking is a frequent theme in Kant's writings, particularly in the Critique of 
Judgment (1790), where he dealt with teleological judgments at length. In his teleological 
writings, Kant wrestles with the idea of progress and with the notion of the development of the 
human race. Although it is understood that he was a child of his day, Kant is judged severely of 
trivializing Africa in his writings on the progress of history, because his knowledge and 
deliberate conclusions on humankind are restricted to the European race. In his book, On the 
Common Saying: That May be Correct in Theory but it is of no Use in Practice (hereafter, 
Theory and Practice) Kant (1999a, 306) assumes that the human race is constantly advancing in 
terms of culture and is also constantly improving in relation "to the moral end of its existence." It 
is possible that "this progress may at times be interrupted" but it will never be "broken off" 
(Kant, 1999, 306).  
The fulcrum on which Kant rests his assumption of progress is the innate duty of every 
member of every generation to see to it that posterity keeps on making constant progress in 
cultural matters (Kant, 1999, 306). This is because "practical reason orders us to act on the 
hypothesis that the world as a whole is progressing" (Despland, 1973, 39). According to 
Despland (1973, 17), teleological thinking carries with it the idea of constant progress in nature 
and history, “aiming towards the realisation of a good goal or a desirable purpose." Its basic 
assumption is that "the world is progressing towards a greater perfection” in the sense of heading 
towards some end point (Despland, 1973, 17). In the book, Critique of Judgment, Kant (1952, 
92-95 [430-432]) maintains that the ultimate end (or purpose) of nature as a teleological system 
is culture – which is the whole vocation of humanity – and it is culture that gives man the 
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aptitude for freedom. Consequently the ultimate end – culture – is "the production of our human 
capacity to set our own purposes and make ourselves moral beings independent of nature … and 
ordering of all civil states into a cosmopolitan whole unified in a morally grounded system" 
(Makkreel, 1989-90, 177). Makkreel agrees with Walsh (1967, 321) that Kant proposes that a 
hidden plan – nature in history – may well be able to provide conditions for the progressive 
development of human capacities, so that men can move from barbarism to culture, thus 
converting “a social union originating in pathological needs into a moral whole.”  
Fukuyama takes Kant’s view of that culture is the underlying force to progressive 
development of liberal democracy. He continues to make reference that if any nation wants to be 
progressive, it must change its cultural pre-conditions to prepare for liberal democracy. In other 
words, in order to embrace liberal democracy, Africa must change its cultural pre-conditions like 
what the Japanese did – argues Fukuyama. The movement from the state of lawlessness to the 
state of culture, where humankind embraces the culture of civil society through the signing of the 
original contract illustrates the Kantian theoretical explanation of the progression of human 
history. Although Kant had such an interesting topic to handle, his teleological theory was only 
looking at the Western world but ignoring Africa. However there was an economic and political 
agenda in Europe, that of the conquering of Africa for commerce and industry. That omission 
made it difficult for the West to see Africa as part of the world. By taking the hegemonic 
approach with a Kantian universal flavor, may be unknowingly, Fukuyama portrayed the West 
within the political framework of liberal democracy as the last form of government.  
Kant proposes that Universal Human History will progress towards an endpoint – the 
realization of human freedom – entrenched in a civic constitution. His conception and expression 
of a universal human history focuses on Europe of his day Kand’s universal history is propelled 
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towards its end point through the mechanism of antagonism, caused by what Kant calls man’s 
“asocial sociability.” The idea of an all-encompassing cosmopolitan3 world in Kant's critical 
philosophy first appears in his essay, Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of 
View (1784) (hereafter IUH) where human history is viewed as a teleological extension of natural 
history (Makkreel, 1989, 90:177). In the IUH Kant (1993, 250-251) argues that anything that 
fails "to fulfil its purpose is a contradiction in the teleological theory of nature." In effect, Kant is 
arguing for a teleological hermeneutic starting point in his theory of history. This will allow us to 
interpret and understand human history as having both meaning and purpose.   
Kant envisages the end of history, at some point in time, in universal terms. It must be 
understood that Kant’s universalism excludes Africa – for Africa did not feature in his 
conception of the world. In the Critique of Judgment (section 23(84)) where he discusses "[t]he 
final end of the existence of a world, that is, of creation itself," Kant (1952, 98 [435]), defines 
"the final end" as "an end that does not require any other end as condition of its possibility." 
Thus, human history has a final goal – a final universal purpose – which Kant views as the 
realisation of human freedom. This freedom, in the practical sphere, is presupposed by reason 
(Kant, 1952, 58[400]), first in each individual, and then in a corporate will (after Rousseau's idea 
of will). Kant (1952, 118[550]) argues that it is through freedom that humanity, under the moral 
law, can set itself a final end; the achievement of the highest possible good in the world – 
happiness.  On happiness, Guyer (2000, 13) comments that,  
… the realization that our own freedom of choice and action is the fundamental 
object of morality itself makes a systematic realization of happiness the ultimate 
                                            
3 The concept of a “cosmopolitan” world appears in the Idea for a Universal History. Kant (quoted in Caygill, 
1995:137) describes it as “the matrix” within which “all the original capacities of the human race may develop”. 
Caygill (1995, 137-138) views it as “a necessary step towards achieving a civil society which can administer 
justice universally” and achieve universal political security.  
  
9  
  
object of morality, because freedom is, essentially the capacity to set our own 
ends, and happiness is, essentially, the realization of our freely set ends.  
In effect, Kant attempts to universalize a rational approach to the achievement of moral 
and political harmony in the making of a universal history of humanity. However, Kant, in his 
essay, The End of All Things (1794) still conceives the possibility of a catastrophic end of history 
as a result of human stupidity, man's failure to reason well, or through human cultural and moral 
immaturity.  
It is the Kantian ideas of the progress of human history to an end point that lead to 
cosmopolitanism and universalization of ideals of Western history that Fukuyama takes  to 
declare liberal democracy as the world’s end time ideology of all times. Furthermore, he 
combines the above with Hegel’s end of history debut.  
2.2 Hegel: The End of World History and its Ideals  
Kant’s creation of the idea of a universal human history was taken up in Hegel’s 
philosophy of history. It gave fodder to Hegel’s deliberate invisibilization of African history. The 
end of history sees the triumph of a powerful man, the creation of a world history that should 
understand human existence in a single and prescribed manner. Fukuyama takes the Hegelian 
end of history and its ideals, as expounded by Kojeve. Kojeve argued that the progress of history 
must reach an end in the formation of a universal homogenous state.   
Hegel ends history with the present (his present that is), as a way of avoiding prediction. 
This seems incompatible with his teleological presuppositions. He views history as explaining 
the progression of events from the past towards a certain point in the future, and that future is the 
present. The present is described as the complete “realization of freedom and self-consciousness” 
(Inwood, 1992, 119). In the Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: Introduction 
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(hereinafter, the Lectures), Hegel (1980, 26, 28) argues that the sole aim of history “is to 
comprehend clearly what is and what has been, the events and deeds of the past … by means of 
reason.” This is because reason concerns itself with the absolute, not with particular or finite 
ends. This makes it a duty to think of world history in connection with its “ultimate end”, for it is 
this intention that underlies the world. And this intention is the knowledge of the “Idea of human 
freedom” (Hegel, 1980, 46). Haddock (1980, 114) points out that it is in the Lectures that Hegel 
attempts to show that "while logic was concerned with the principle of reason, history 
represented the elaboration of its implications in a concrete form."  
The Idea operates through the medium of the human spirit, and it assumes three forms: 
(1) reveals itself in its purest form – thought (reason), (2) expresses itself in the form of physical 
nature, and (3) takes the form of spirit in the Absolute sense (Hegel, 1980, 28). Here Hegel 
secularizes the Judeo-Christian doctrine concerning God to become the philosophical Idea: 
“while logic was concerned with the principle of reason, history represented the elaboration of its 
implications in a concrete form.” Hence, Hegel’s (1980, 28) argument that reason, as an ultimate 
design, governs world history, and that consequently, world history is “a rational process.” This 
may imply that all historical events are predestined to usher in a new world order based on the 
philosophy of consciousness. Yar (2001) points out that Kojève used “the twin lenses of Karl 
Marx’s materialism and Heidegger’s temporalised ontology of human being” to read Hegel’s 
philosophy of consciousness. In the process Kojève criticized Heidegger for “valorising the 
contemplative side of humanity”, preferring Hegel for stressing humanity’s active side, with his 
argument that the Hegelian subject makes history – it is active (Attias, 2002a).   
Kojève’s materialist critique stems from “an Isocratic conception of the role of the 
philosopher as a historical actor” (Attias, 2002a). Kojève similarly wanted to see philosophy as a 
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political enterprise that should be engaged “in changing the material world.” Arguing in the same 
vein, Gans (2002) is convinced that there is “no doubt Kojève had political reasons” for singling 
out the “Lordship and Bondage” section of Phenomenology, “which can be read as an ordinary 
analysis of the Marxist category of exploitation.”   
Kojève preferred Marx’s materialist approach in contrast to Hegel’s armchair idealistic 
philosophy. Kojève advocated a practical and concrete philosophy that was relevant to the 
existing world. Although he does not offer philosophical advice to the ruling class, as Isocrates 
did, Kojève maintains that “the philosopher had to be a man of action” (Attias, 2002a), and he 
emphasizes “the element of work as the humanizing factor for mankind” (Rauch, 1999, 127). 
This leaves us at a paradoxical point, because Kojève (1969, 90) simultaneously holds that a 
philosopher is always a person who only understands things after their eventuality. That means, 
as a standard of judgment, one cannot reliably evaluate a philosophy before the end of history – 
hence Hegel’s comparison of the philosopher to Minerva’s Owl that “takes its flight only when 
the shades of nights are gathering” (Attias, 2002a). Attias (2002a) interprets Kojève as arguing 
that a philosopher is only able to see things clearly and explain them after the event; philosophers 
always arrive too late to say what should happen. This explains the importance of Hegel’s notion 
of the “end of history” – Absolute Knowledge is only achieved when history has reached its end 
(Attias, 2002a; Cf. Kojève, 1969, 88-99). But one wonders, who would have lived to see the 
whole of history in order to interpret it correctly. Attias (2002a) criticizes the idea as “a self-
referential, closed philosophical system, because whoever has the power to declare an end to 
history gets the power to judge history.” That is to say, “by declaring history ‘over’ one 
legitimizes a concept of “the inherent reasonableness of existing power relations” (Attias, 2002a). 
It is within that understanding that this author criticizes Fukuyama’s notion of the end of history 
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and that of the last man that it declares that liberal democracy is the ultimate end of human 
thinking with regard to governance and sovereignty.  
This makes Fukuyama and followers’ position to have problems with the emergence of 
China, Russia and the African continent. According to Attias (2002a), Kojève (Kojeve, 1969, 
185), in his reading of Hegel, seeks to address the main problem of historical judgment – viz. 
finding a criterion by which human beings can judge their actions in the progress of history. 
Kojève wants an anthropocentric criterion – for he held that human history must be judged from 
within human history, not from some external “suprahistorical space” outside the terrestrial 
world (Attias, 2002a). In other words Kojeve rejects a metaphysical starting point: while he 
brings in the idea of an end of history that is under a universal homogenous state.  
In the Lectures the most important idea tackled by Hegel is the idea of the “end of 
history.” What did he mean by this phrase? Philosophical commentators have wrestled with this 
question. Berthold-Bond (Fritzman, 2001, 299) argues that Hegel's fulfilment of history falls into 
two alternatives: that is, either Hegel’s eschatological vision is of a completely final end, where 
progress in history or knowledge is impossible, or it is an epochal conception, where the 
completion he speaks of is the fulfilment of an historical epoch, leaving the future open to 
progress. Furthermore, on the one hand, Fritzman (2001, 295-320) argues that in Hegel, the 
future "always is radically contingent, open-ended, and not-yet;" and on the other hand, Fritzman 
criticizes Kojève and Fukuyama for claiming that for Hegel history is over. According to Kojève 
(1969, 67) and Graham (1998, 454) for Hegel the end of history is not the coming of the 
Kingdom of God, but the coming of absolute mind or spirit. Hegel cannot talk of history as a 
final end point in time due to his reliance on the dialectical method. If he did, it would contradict 
his triadic framework that implies a continuous and unending cyclic process, an unending spiral 
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that aims at reaching Absolute knowledge. Hegel, especially in the Lectures (1980), supposes 
that history does, at some time or other, come to a close. In the Lectures the clause – "the 
ultimate end of the world history" – refers to the mind's consciousness of its freedom (Hegel, 
1980, 41).  
It was this freedom that Fukuyama interpreted as the core cultural pre-condition of liberal 
democracy that should be ushered in the world through civil society. It follows that history for 
Hegel ends with his era: which he often describes as the full realization of self-consciousness, 
freedom and recognition. One wonders if this realization includes the African continent whose 
history he does not see as part of the universal developments. Also, for Hegel, history has little to 
do with the future, for the future does not concern the historian and the philosopher. If Hegelian 
history has no future, then there is no future for the realization of the ideals of liberal democracy 
for the African people. In other words, we are already living in the end of history. Central to the 
end of history is the concept of freedom. Beiser (1993, 295) concludes that Hegel, in viewing 
“the end of history as the self-awareness of freedom” and “as the recognition that all are free,” 
made the French Revolution ideals of liberty and equality, “the very end of history itself”, to such 
an extent that he saw them as falling under the law of necessity. Furthermore, Beiser (1993 295) 
points out that in doing so, Hegel intends the ideals to be goals that people “must strive for 
through the inherent laws of history itself”.   
As already indicated above, the notion of the end of history according to Kant and Hegel 
involves three fundamental ideals namely absolute knowledge (or self-consciousness), 
recognition, and freedom. Fukuyama attempted to give these ideals an explanation by using 
philosophical interpretivism and concretizing them with economic growth issues, human society, 
and liberal democracy as the ideology finale for humankind. The realization of these three ideals, 
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according to Hegel, marks the end of human history. Fukuyama takes these three ideals to define 
or to describe his notion of the end of history and the practice of the last man – whom he sees in 
the triumph of the USA after the fall of the USSR. By the time Fukuyama was propagating the 
above views, he was not seeing the rising up of China and Russia that would grow to reinterpret 
market economy within the bounds of communism: separation between economics and politics. 
The other overlook he did was to fail to see that even if the ideals of the end of history were the 
basis of liberal democracy, Africa was not privy to equal opportunity, affording and benefiting 
from those ideals. His notion was disenfranchising the nation states of Africa and the developing 
world in the bigger picture, especially in world bodies like the UN.   
3. AFRICA IN THE IDEALS OF THE END OF HISTORY  
Fukuyama is imbibed by the “philosophical constructions of finality” (Herwitz, 2013, 
222) of Kant, Hegel, and Marx through the interpretation of Kojeve that leaves him not seeing 
the danger of creating an ideological finality. Such finality is intended to give an assurance that a 
philosophical structure of the future can be assigned to the tailor-making of history that will 
fashion the economic, societal, and political developments.  Such an approach to the process of 
history tends to universalize perceptions on ideals that should lay foundation to the understanding 
of history.  
The evolution of a universal ideology in the name of liberal democracy leaves Africa an 
irreparably disenfranchised and invisibilized continent in that the ideals of the end of history do 
not equally benefit the developing world as it does the West. If Africans do not merger their 
worldviews with the one perceived to be universal – especially the culture of civil society then 
her future is doomed. The ideals of the notion of the end of history that Fukuyama presents are 
founded on the declaration of liberal democracy as the sole ideology for the world.  
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The above manifests Fukuyama’s appropriation of Kantian universalization of western 
history and cultural preconditions, Hegel’s end of history and Kojeve’s idea of a universal and 
homogenous state. This meant that the declaration of liberal democracy as the final form of 
government to the world was its universalization, regardless of how it was implemented. It also 
meant Fukuyama’s appropriation of Hegel’s notion of end of history that required recognition, 
freedom and absolute knowing if the dream is to be realized.  
Kojève argued that the evolution of history leads towards the establishment of a 
“universal and homogenous” state. Fukuyama had concluded that the end will compel 
humankind to consider liberal democracy the one and only universal and homogenous form of 
government on earth – but overlooking its disenfranchising weaker states like those in Africa. It 
was this universal and homogenous state that Fukuyama borrowed from Kojeve when he 
declared liberal democracy as the sole ideology that was left for humankind. Hence, as already 
mentioned, Fukuyama argues that the end of history is seen in the advent and universalization of 
Western liberal democracy that may signal the endpoint of humankind’s ideological evolution 
and ushering of a new era of the final form of human government.  
Fukuyama’s position contradicts Karl Marx’s position – that of socialism. Most post-
independent African politicians and people subscribed to socialism (and continue to do so) as a 
logical conclusion for mobilization in their revolutions and post-independent socio-political and 
economic development intentions – that is hoping that history would end with communism 
superseding capitalism. This is because Marx held that as an ongoing dialectical materialism 
process, in a deterministic engagement with any oppressive situation, the end of history finds its 
end too. It is within this determination that humankind make choices that may either be 
individual or national. As a nation, people might choose to be free from the control of another 
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nation. However, it is not yet uhuru (freedom) in Africa because Africa has not yet freed herself 
from choices influenced by superpowers. There is need for Africa to continue to struggle against 
self-ignorance to achieve self-knowledge, for freedom from neo-colonialism and for mutual 
recognition.  
3.1 Absolute Knowing: African struggle for self-consciousness  
One of the impediments to the African endeavor to achieve self-knowledge is external 
definition by pre-colonial European missionary ethnography, Western anthropology (Kant and 
Hegel), history, and political perceptions based so much on poor race relations. These definitions 
usurped African opportunity for self-definition to lay foundation for self-consciousness. In 
Consciencism, Kwame Nkrumah (1969, 20) shows that self-consciousness is a result of a process 
he calls categorical conversion. Nkrumah (1969, 20) describes categorical conversion as follows; 
“By categorical conversion, I mean such a thing as the emergence of self-consciousness from 
that which is not self-conscious; such a thing as the emergence of mind from matter, of quality 
from quantity”.  
Central to Nkrumah’s view are the priorities of reawakening cultural self-consciousness 
and national self-consciousness. One is compelled to raise a question: has categorical conversion 
that gives birth to self-consciousness taken place yet so that the African people can be able to 
fight for their freedom and recognition? Or is it a continuous process until we achieve ultimate 
freedom and mutual recognition. If not now, when shall it happen? In The Wretched of the Earth, 
Fanon (1963, 203-204) further elaborates self-consciousness of the African people; 
The Africans, … contrary to what is commonly believed, are quick to build a 
social and political consciousness. The danger is that very often they reach the 
stage of social consciousness before reaching the national phase. In this case the 
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underdeveloped countries’ violent calls for social justice are combined, 
paradoxically enough, with an often primitive tribalism. If nationalism is not 
explained, enriched, and deepened, if it does not very quickly turn into a social 
and political consciousness, into humanism, then it leads to a dead end. A 
bourgeois leadership of the underdeveloped countries confines the national 
consciousness to a sterile formalism. Only the massive commitment by men and 
women to judicious and productive tasks gives form and substance to this 
consciousness.  
Furthermore Fanon (1963, 204) argues that Africans should be able to know who they are 
first by declaring, “I am not a prisoner of History” or “We’ve had enough.”  He further asserts 
that “it is through self-consciousness and renunciation… that man can create the ideal conditions 
of existence for a human world” (Fanon, 1963, 206). One is compelled to think that there is an 
influence of the Cartesian philosophy of objectification of the other that needs the African to 
overcome and lay claims to a true humanity. There are sporadic pop-ups of individuals and 
individual groups that engaged in the fight for self-definition and reawakening of self-
consciousness. Some of these are seen in the writings and actions of various black consciousness 
awakening movements such as Martin Luther Jr. and the civil rights movement in the United 
State of America, Shaka and the Zulus, Nehanda and Kaguvi in Zimbabwe, and Kwame 
Nkrumah in Ghana.   
Theoretically, the emergence of the idea of self-consciousness is illustrated in Hegel in 
the account of the conflict of the master and the slave. It is this illustration which Hegel uses to 
demonstrate the logic of the dialectical process (Hegel, 1977, 111-119; Cf. Haddock, 1980, 113). 
It is in the discourse of self-consciousness that Hegel rejects all dichotomies, including the 
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Platonic dualism of juxtaposing the intelligible and the sensible (Rauch and Sherman, 1999, 78), 
because at the end of time everything becomes one, or a spiritual whole.  
Rauch and Sherman (1999, 55) raised a very important question: “How do we arrive at 
self-consciousness?” In normal circumstances it is rare to think about our thinking, unless there 
are “problematic aspects of our experience” that will lead us to do so (Rauch and Sherman, 1999, 
55). In other words, it is easier to think about things outside us than to look inwards, but the act 
of looking inwards indicates some contradiction. The journey to arrive at self-consciousness 
requires a process that begins with thought (consciousness) thinking about itself as a result of our 
immediate experience – namely dialectical contradictions, or unrest, within us. The implication 
here is that to be certain of itself, self-consciousness must overcome or “supersede” the 
“otherness of itself” (Hegel, 1977, 111[178-181]). Hegel makes a distinction between human and 
animal desires. Human desire “involves not just the satisfaction of basic needs but also the desire 
for recognition from another human being” (Attias, 2002a). For that to happen, the African 
people had to and must continue to struggle against all negatives to achieve their freedom.  
The idea of the Absolute in Hegel points to the completion of a process that is 
characterised by what Rauch and Sherman (1999, 2) call “successive forms of consciousness”, 
generally referred to as the ‘succession of shapes’. Each form or shape of consciousness reflects 
“the world view of a specific time period.” Hence, Hegel’s (1977, 11[20]) assertion: Of the 
Absolute it must be said that it is essentially a result, that only in the end is it what it truly is; and 
that precisely in this consists its nature, viz to be actual, subject, the spontaneous becoming of 
itself. Solomon (1983, 635) comments that the concept of the “Absolute” in Hegel implies the 
ultimate product of a process. Propelled by the inherent motor of dialectical forces, conceptual 
development proceeds until “consciousness ascends to that state which Hegel calls ‘Absolute 
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Knowing’” (Rauch and Sherman, 1999; cf. Hegel, 1977, 478-493[788-808]). Due to the fact that 
Hegel rejected the subject-object separation model of knowledge acquisition, it is in absolute 
knowing that consciousness will recognize that “its knowledge of objects is ultimately self-
knowledge, and that self-knowledge is always conditioned by some existing set of socio-
historical categories” (Rauch and Sherman, 1999, 2-3).This makes absolute knowing a context-
bound process driven by dialectic movement. If the African process of self-knowledge is situated 
in the Eurocentric context, or propelled by outsiders, then the African successive forms of 
consciousness will not be able to reach completion. Policies crafted by the UN do not include the 
African worldview or allow a well-reflected and inclusive world-view that sees Africa playing a 
contributive role as a permanent member of the Security Council. Some of the UN’s and IMF’s 
policies that Africa as a continent subscribes to are simply prescriptive.  
Absolute knowing appears simultaneously as the last shape of consciousness and the truth 
of “the revealed religion” (Hegel, 1977, 480[789]). It is a process in which “inter-subjective self-
awareness in the community’s institutions and practices” takes place (Sembou, 2003, 276). In 
other words, absolute knowing is a point of reflection and comprehension of all the shapes of 
consciousness – hence its enthronement above the historical struggle for recognition. Africans 
are yet to understand their struggles against tribalism, misery, diseases, ignorance, neo-
colonialism, economic woes, and various forms of hangovers that hinders them from achieving 
freedom and recognition. For Sembou (2003, 279), fundamental to ‘spirit’, or interpersonal 
relationships, is a struggle for recognition that gives shape to human life and is a driving force for 
change – this points to Africa. Upon the realisation of this inherent driving force, Africa and the 
human race are considered to have arrived at the point of absolute knowing (Sembou, 2003). It is 
only then that Africans, discover that they are responsible for defining themselves and their 
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conditions. In Sembou’s (2003, 279) words, it is only Africans who can define “the beliefs and 
values of the society in which they live and that these beliefs and values in turn underlie social 
and political institutions, as well as governing all relationships among them”: and also the 
international world. They thus express their deep-seated and long-standing aspirations for 
freedom.   
For Hegel, human history is a succession of shapes, a series of dialectical forms through 
which humans pose their deepest aspirations, and the world is seen as the expression of these 
aspirations. These aspirations, according to Kojève and Fukuyama, are condensed in the notion 
of recognition. Gradually through the dialectic of shapes and aspirations, humans come to 
synthesise their aspirations, and to remake their worlds into better forms. When finally the world 
and aspiration do not conflict, these aspirations are fully realised, and it is at this moment that the 
nation state appears. It is at this moment when aspirations are fully realised, in other words, when 
history is fully knowable, that history can be reviewed by philosophy. For Hegel the sole task of 
philosophy is therefore to know our history, to achieve absolute knowledge of the gradual 
unfolding of the Idea of human freedom. However, he leaves us wondering whether this end 
implies that there will be no further human experience, or any further need for knowing 
ourselves.  
Individual and national self-consciousness is an indispensable and fundamental basis for 
the necessity of human freedom. In the words of Leo Franchi (199), the concept of human 
freedom, “is undoubtedly one of the most fundamental ideas that has driven the development of 
democratic politics.” For an African, absolute knowing is when one is able to realize that it is not 
yet uhuru (freedom): therefore, one must fight for freedom in its holistic existence for him or her 
to be recognized by other free people.   
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3.2 Africa’s Struggle for Freedom  
In Sartre’s philosophy, we encounter the presentation of freedom as the cause of the 
determination of self-consciousness. Sartre (1943: 553-554), in Being and Nothingness, declares 
his theory of freedom: “Man is condemned to be free; because once thrown into the world, he is 
responsible for everything he does. It is up to you to give [life] a meaning”. Furthermore, Sartre 
explains: “Life has no meaning a priori … It is up to you to give it a meaning, and value is 
nothing but the meaning that you choose”.  
Lack of freedom and recognition triggered and continues to cause inferioritization of the 
African people and continent. African disenfranchisement began long back when Arab groups 
came to the continent and engage in slavery – to the extent of annihilating the black race in North 
Africa. The act of enslavement usurped the African momentum for development. According to 
Fanon (1962: 160),   
The missionaries find it opportune to remind the masses that long before the advent of 
European colonialism the great African empires were disrupted by the Arab invasion. 
There is no hesitation in saying that it was the Arab occupation which paved the way for 
European colonialism; Arab imperialism commonly spoken of, and the cultural 
imperialism of Islam is condemned.  
The dialectic period between the Arab invasion and European colonialism led to African 
revolutionary wars struggling for the right to freedom. Hegel maintains that human history, driven 
by dialectic forces, is moving toward an expected goal or purposive end – freedom. The idea of 
the will plays a central role in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (1896). It exerts a comprehensive 
influence on Hegel’s conception of the individual, the family, the state, and possibly, civil society. 
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In the Philosophy of Right Hegel shows that there is an inseparable connection between the will 
and right. For Hegel (1896, 212 [215]), “right concerns freedom, the worthiest and holiest thing in 
man, the thing which he must know in so far as he is answerable to it” to the state. Smith (1998) 
points out that for Hegel the “idea of Right is inseparable from the realization of the concept of 
Freedom”. Based on free will, freedom constitutes the will’s substance and destiny. This freedom 
must however have some preconditions for it to be actualisable. In Hegel’s view recognition is a 
precondition for freedom: one can only be free if one is recognized as such, and one can only be 
so recognized if recognition is given freely. Freedom depends on recognition by the other and 
constraint toward the Other. Pippin (1993, 52-85) comments that these claims of Hegel’s not only 
tell us that our freedom is self-determined, but also open up the whole discussion of the activities 
that occupy human life – particularly those surrounding work. Pelczynski (1984, 64) describes 
Hegel’s view of freedom as being ‘contextual”, in the sense that it is always conceived in a 
“social context” or in a “context of human interaction.” Having followed Hegel’s inquiry closely, 
Pelczynski (1984, 64) identifies four major kinds of freedom with their respective contexts of 
human interactions, namely the natural, ethical, civil and political contexts.   
  One of the major ideals of Fukuyama’s notion of the end of history is that liberal 
democracy affords humankind with freedom for each citizen of the universal government. 
According to Pelczynski (1984, 69-70), freedom “pervades all aspects of social life, all relations, 
institutions and communities” as an ethical substratum. Ethical freedom is a life of rational 
fulfilment based on what is expected of each individual. The recognition of the claim that 
whatever in the civic community and the state is rationally necessary should occur through 
subjective free choice is a fuller definition of the popular idea of freedom. Hegel (1980, 54) 
declares that “world history is the progress of the consciousness of freedom – a progress whose 
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necessity it is our business to comprehend,” for freedom is the recognition of necessity. The 
progress of history points to the final end product of the dialectics of history – the establishment 
of the universal state. If Hegel is understood correctly, it is only after the concrete 
institutionalisation of freedom and the acceptance of institutions as “an expression of the 
character of a people” (Haddock, 1990, 160) that perfect freedom can be experienced. In 
Lectures, Hegel (1980, 120) argues that “the state is the spiritual Idea internalised in the human 
will and its freedom.” The problem is that Hegel here leaves us with no answer as to whether he 
views history as cyclical or linear. First he talks of a dialectical history that will end in the 
emergence of a homogeneous or universal state that will satisfy the desire for recognition and 
freedom. Since dialectics is a continuous process, when will the final dialectic occur that will end 
in final sublimation?  
  The final sublimation is characterized by freedom of nation states and their citizens that 
will see themselves achieving self-determination. However this has not taken place yet as many 
African governments revert to the mercies of former colonial masters to redirect social-political 
and economic programs when they fail. It is during this time that they are referred to as failed 
states. In this way, freedom is denied.  
3.3 Africa’s Struggle for Recognition  
Participation in the international political economy or global political economy shows 
that it is not changing to make Africa a significant and recognized participant in that  Africa is 
not yet part of the group of permanent members of the UN that includes USA, UK, France, 
China, and Russia – even if when Africans repeatedly cried foul. The world’s powerful nations 
do not recognize Africa’s nations as equal members of the UN before the International Law and 
practices. For many years now, African struggle for recognition as a continent has been stifled by 
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tribal wars, politics of factions, wars of opposing groups under external sponsorship by foreign 
governments, international companies such as pharmaceutical corporates, mining giants, and 
other covert operations. Africa continues to call for mutual recognition in human existence. The 
call by African states to have representation in the UN club of permanent members continues to 
fail to sail through in UN circles.  
Fukuyama discusses in depth the ideal of recognition in his notion of the end of history. 
He goes to the archives to dig deep in Hegel’s philosophy. Hegel discusses the idea of 
recognition in many of his writings, but particularly in Systems of Ethical Life and 
Phenomenology of the Spirit. There is a conflict of views among scholars as to when – in terms 
of publication – Hegel first talked about reciprocal recognition. Honneth (1995) argues that the 
young Hegel developed his model of a ‘struggle for recognition’ by critically modifying the idea 
of ‘social struggle’ initially employed in the social and political philosophies of Machiavelli and 
Hobbes. Contrary to Machiavelli and Hobbes’ ‘struggle of all against all,’ Hegel’s idea of 
recognition takes the fundamental form of interpersonal recognition as its point of departure. 
According to Blunden (2003), the idea of recognition in Hegel begins in his work, Systems of 
Ethical Life (1802-3), where it arises as property, emerging “from the social division of labour 
and the exchange of products.” If Blunden’s claim is correct, it is an idea that develops from the 
market context whereby the property owner’s rights are recognised. Honneth (1995, 7-70) also 
traces the idea of struggle for recognition in Hegel’s works Systems of Ethical Life, 
Realphilosophie, and Phenomenology of Spirit. He points out that Systems of Ethical Life shows 
Hegel’s early “philosophical account with elementary forms of interpersonal recognition” 
(Honneth, 1995, 18-19). In other words, Systems of Ethical Life gives an elementary and sketchy 
account with regard to the motivations that would lead to struggles for recognition. This counters 
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Blunden’s claim that Hegel’s idea of mutual recognition began in the System of Ethical Life. 
According to Honneth (1995, 26-29). 
Hegel had in Systems of Ethical Life, not yet established the “motives for initiating a 
conflict in the interior of the human spirit” that could lead to the struggle for recognition – hence 
he resorts to the philosophy of consciousness. Crime was a formative factor in the struggle for 
recognition that is resolved in reconciliation. In the Phenomenology Hegel treats “the 
development of consciousness as the key to historical change” by tracing the “odyssey of 
consciousness” from sense-certainty to Absolute Knowing through a succession of forms (or 
shapes) which generate their own movement (Haddock, 1980, 113; Cf. Rauch and Sherman, 
1999, 76-86).  
Attias (2002a) maintains that “self-consciousness is Desire in general” that it gets fulfilled 
“only in another self-consciousness” through “struggle to death for recognition” (Hegel, 1977, 
104-105; 108-110). According to Hegel (cited in Kojève 1969, 192), Man is nothing but Desire 
for recognition … and History is but the process of the progressive satisfaction of this Desire, 
which is fully satisfied in and by the universal and homogeneous State. Kojève (1969, 192-193) 
does not agree with Hegel that this State will definitely satisfy man’s desire, because it is still in 
the making and is still far from having an “empirical existence.” Although it is possible that this 
state can satisfy the desire of man, Kojève (1969, 192-193) shows that there is a possibility that 
the very State is subject to negation someday by “a negating or creative Action … other than the 
Action of Fighting and Work.” Furthermore, Kojève (1969, 193) argues that one can know about 
the satisfaction of man if and only if, one has “complete and perfect knowledge” about man. This 
“universally and definitively … valid” knowledge – “the absolute truth about the satisfaction of 
man can be attained only at the end of History” (Kojève, 1969, 193). Although Kojève talks 
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about the end of history as an end point when full knowledge about humanity will be acquired, he 
(Kojève, 1969:193) raises a number of questions; who “is precisely to determine this end of 
History” and, who declares the end of history? Kojève (1969, 9-70) turns to the Hegelian master-
slave dialectic, claiming that it is the key to understanding Hegel’s philosophy of history and the 
motor for historical change. Attias (2002b) structures Kojève’s presentation of the masterslave 
dialectic as follows: (a) the bloody battle, (b) the reign of the master, and (c) the revolt and 
triumph of the slave (Attias, 2002b).  
Kojève’s handling of the master/slave dialectic alludes to the possibility of the social 
contract. Attias (2002a) may be correct in arguing that implicit in the Hegelian master-slave 
battle for recognition is “a Hobbesian war of all against all – because humans want recognition 
from the other, but without giving reciprocal recognition.” This one-sided state of affairs is 
described by Kojève (1969, 18-20, 45-59; cf. Hegel, 1977, 113-116[186-191]) as the “bloody 
battle” that involves two men engaged in “a life or death struggle that stops short of death” and 
whose end product is a one-sided and unequal recognition (Attias, 2000a). The condition of 
possibility for recognition of the would-be master emerges at the moment of the imminent death 
of the would-be slave, when he feels the intensity of terror exerted by his opponent, in this fierce 
battle for recognition. Kojève does not view this bloody battle as “a primordial condition or event 
but rather the motor of history” that works as his hermeneutical framework for interpreting and 
understanding historical progress and all historical change (Attias, 2002 a & b).  
After progressing through all these ideologies, the slave will then have to revolt against, 
and triumph over, the reign of the master in order to obtain recognition. Attias (2002a) interprets 
Kojève as viewing the uprising by the slave as leading to the “formation of a classless society at 
the end of history.” It is marked by the total satisfaction of the human desire for recognition. 
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Given his Hegelian-Marxist materialist assumptions, Kojève (1969, 158n-160n) thought that the 
end of history was to be a material fact in history. An utopian society, under a universal and 
homogeneous state, was “already the present, here and now” in Europe in the nineteen thirties. It 
was characterised by the cessation of Action – meaning the practical “disappearance of wars and 
bloody revolutions." Furthermore, in this homogeneous state, the “‘specific differences’ … of 
class, race, and so on, are ‘overcome’” and as a result, the homogeneous state is directly related 
to a specific individual who is recognised as a citizen in his very particularity (Kojève, 1969, 
237). Any action that followed was an extension “in space of the universal revolutionary force 
actualised in France” and the rest of the world, either by societization (Russia), communisation 
(China), democratization (imperial Germany and North America), or by accession to 
independence (on the African continent) (Kojève, 1969, 160n-162n). Unlike Hegel, who made 
racist remarks about Africa, Kojève was inclusive, if not comprehensive, in his interpretation of 
history. Kojève (1969, 163) finally identifies the end of history as marked by the total satisfaction 
of human desire under a classless society where the state will guarantee that each citizen’s desire 
for recognition is satisfied. Here we clearly see the influence of Marxist ideas in Kojève’s 
philosophy. It is at this end of history that the philosopher can commence his project of historical 
judgement. Like many other writers, Kojeve is silent about Africa and its disenfranchisement.   
Addressing the issue of recognition, Fukuyama (1992, 161) argues in favour of Hegel and against 
Hobbes and Locke. He contends that Hegel seeks to honour and preserve a certain moral 
dimension to human life that is entirely missing in the society conceived of by Hobbes and 
Locke. Hegel, in other words, understands man as a moral agent whose specific dignity is related 
to his inner freedom from physical or natural determination. It is this moral dimension, and the 
struggle to have it recognized, that is the motor driving the dialectical process of history. Thus 
28  
  
Fukuyama is saying that Hobbes and Locke did not go further than the empirical aspect – which 
is the material well-being of mankind. Hegel goes further, bringing in the metaphysical aspect of 
humanity – the desire for recognition. It is this aspect of human life, Fukuyama claims, that it is 
fulfilled by liberal democracy.  
African struggle for recognition emerges when Africa collects itself together in the 
formation of national revolutionary movements that saw protracted wars of liberation taking 
place leading to independent Africa. The transition from Organization of African Unity to 
African Unity was an attempt created a united front that could see, one day, an African country 
or countries representing Africa in the UN Security Council as a permanent member. African 
countries continue wedge a struggle for recognition.  
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS  
In building his argument for liberal democracy, Fukuyama takes the Kantian ideas of the 
progress of human history to an end point that lead to cosmopolitanism, universalization of ideals 
of Western history, the Hegelian notion of end of history and its ideals (self-consciousness, 
freedom and recognition). It was on the above that he Fukuyama declared liberal democracy as 
the world’s universal and end  of time ideology of all times for the progress of humankind.  
Liberal democracy is not yet a perfect ideology for social, economic, and political 
development in Africa although is portrayed as a civilized ideology. It is still open to 
modification due to a number of Africa’s diversified worldviews and cultural preconditions that 
cannot be changed overnight. What is considered to be moral in its application in the West can be 
viewed as immoral in Africa and elsewhere.   
Africa does not feature in Fukuyama’s ideals of the end of history. It is in the margins or 
yonder side of human history. When the end comes, what Africa needs to is simply to give in to 
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the cultural preconditions of liberal democracy. That will mean all constitutions and policy 
formulation and implementation should be of benefit to powerful nations who make decisions for 
the rest of the world in the UN.   
Fukuyama’s notion of history is characterized by disenfranchisement and idealization of 
the finality in favour of a new world order that should be established under liberal democracy. 
The framework in which the end of history is interpreted are teleological in nature. This 
teleological view of history assumes that history is moving towards an end point, or fulfillment 
of a purpose. Fukuyama attempts to universalize the purpose as homogenous in such a way that 
all nation-states of the world should be placed under common cultural preconditions that will see 
even African nations adapting western liberal democracy.  
As has been seen above, in his teleological writings, Kant wrestles with the idea of 
progress, the notion of the development of human society, and the formation of the state. The all-
encompassing cosmopolitanism in Kant's critical philosophy (where human history is viewed as 
a teleological extension of natural history on a global scale) envisages the coming of a universal 
history that is based on the possibility of a constant advancement of human freedom, rationality, 
morality and political development. Due to his teleological view of history, Kant also suggests 
the end of history at some point in time. His teleo-cosmos is a completely rational and 
secularized moral version of Christian redemption. At the end of history, society will have 
matured rationally, and through good reasoning will unite under an original contract to form a 
civil society that will produce a just civic constitution that assumes a universal nature. This idea 
is most clearly demonstrated in Kant’s idea of a League of Nations.  
Underlying Hegel’s philosophy of history is the law of contradictions that propels the 
dialectical movement of history towards its end. The dialectical process of history is 
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characterised by the human desire for recognition – especially worked out by Hegel in the 
“Lordship and Bondage” section of the Phenomenology. The struggle should end with the 
realization of self-consciousness (absolute knowledge) of individuals and nations, freedom of the 
African peoples and nation states, and mutual recognition between conflicting individuals and 
nations.   
The triumphant advent and settlement of liberal democracy has impact on weaker nations 
of Africa, if not all, and other parts of the world. This paper presents as part of its conclusion that 
Fukuyama based his view of the end of history on Kant, Hegel through Kojeve, and implicitly 
Marx. It is in that connection that this paper puts it that the advent and triumph of Western liberal 
democracy, attempts for its universalization and declaration as the final form of government has 
terrifying implications to African human sociocultural development. Its intended end cannot 
mean the end of human capability to come up with a new form of governing framework: since 
not all nations wholly embrace the ideology as the logical conclusion for social, economic, and 
political development.   
Fukuyama did not think within the possibilities of the aftermaths of such a 
conceptualization of history that it has a tendency of overlooking his position as a source of 
enhancing the disenfranchisement of the weaker states of the world, in particular, those in Africa. 
Africa is left out of the movement of human history towards the ‘superhuman’ by intention. The 
main ideals of Fukuyama’s notion of the end of history, namely, freedom, recognition and 
consciousness have proved not to be meant for the African people unless they assimilate into the 
Western cultural preconditions.  
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